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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS LOCAL 832-S, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.C-5911 
TOWN OF SOUTH BRISTOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Union of Operating Engineers 
Local 832-S has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
^ 
Certification - C-5911 -2 
Included: All Department of Public Works employees. 
Excluded: Highway Superintendent and clerical staff. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 832-S. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jt/WK/ 
Jerome Lefkowitz, G>rairman 
mJ^ S^£%~. 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. 06le, Member 
('") 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FALLS BRIDGE COMMISSION 
EMPLOYEES UNIT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5914 
NIAGARA FALLS BRIDGE COMMISSION, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission 
Employees Unit has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
Certification - C-5914 - 2 -
the settlement of grievances.1 
Included: Toll Collectors, Truck Compound Attendants, Toll Captains, Part-
time employees, Maintenance Men, Building Maintenance 
Foreman and Janitors. 
Excluded: Seasonal temporary employees, Maintenance Foreman and all 
other employees of the employer. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Niagara Falls Bridge Commission Employees Unit. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S.'Hite, Member 
-U^-<—^*(l ^-—-
Sheila S. Q6\e, Member 
1
 Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the 
employee organization representing the petitioned-for unit, disavowed any and all 
interest in representing employees of the Commission's Toll Collectors, Truck 
Compound Attendants, Toll Captains, part-time employees, Maintenance Men, Building 
Maintenance Foreman and Janitors. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5924 
MAHOPAC CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees Union has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
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grievances.1 
Included: Head Bus Driver; Mechanic Foreman; High School Head 
Custodian; Middle School Head Custodian; Middle School Crew 
Chief; High School Crew Chiefs; Elementary Head Custodian; 
Elementary Crew Chiefs; Head Groundskeeper and Head 
Custodian/Crew Chief. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk®witz, Chairman 
t^J- J WfJ*r 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Coj£, Member 
1
 Local 456, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the employee organization 
representing the petitioned-for unit, disavowed any and all interest in representing the 
employees in the Supervisory Association of Mahopac unit. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNCIL OF SCHOOL SUPERVISORS AND 
ADMINISTRATORS, LOCAL 1, AFSA, 
CASE NO. C-5672 
Petitioner, 
-and-
BROOKLYN EXCELSIOR CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
In the Matter of 
BROOKLYN EXCELSIOR CHARTER SCHOOL 
AND NATIONAL HERITAGE ACADEMIES, INC., 
CASE NO. E-2429 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
BRUCE K. BRYANT, GENERAL COUNSEL, for COUNCIL OF SCHOOL 
SUPERVISORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, LOCAL 1, AFSA 
HISCOCK & BARCLAY, LLP (LAURENCE B. OPPENHEIMER of counsel), for 
BROOKLYN EXCELSIOR CHARTER SCHOOL AND NATIONAL HERITAGE 
ACADEMIES, INC. 
JAMES R. SANDNER (FREDERICK K. REICH of counsel), for NEW YORK 
STATE UNITED TEACHERS 
ADAM S. ROSS, SPECIAL COUNSEL, for UNITED FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, AFT, AFL-CIO 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed jointly by the Brooklyn Excelsior 
Charter School (BECS) and the National Heritage Academies, Inc. (NHA) and exceptions 
by the Council of School Supervisors and Administrators, Local 1, AFSA (Association) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),1 dated June 1, 2009. In their exceptions, 
1
 42 PERB 1J4010 (2009). 
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BECS and NHA assert inter alia that the ALJ erred when she rejected their preemption 
argument that is based upon the alleged applicability of the National Labor Relations Act2 
(NLRA) to the employees subject to the parties' respective representation petitions. 
According to their argument, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has exclusive 
jurisdiction over the representation petitions because NHA is a private entity and it, along 
with BECS, constitute a joint employer. 
The New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) and the United Federation of 
Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) have jointly moved for leave to file an amicus 
curiae brief responsive to the preemption argument raised by BECS and NHA. BECS 
and NHA oppose the motion on the following grounds: a) timeliness; b) the issue was fully 
briefed by the parties, as well as NYSUT and UFT, before the ALJ. The Association does 
not object to the Board granting the motion by NYSUT and UFT. 
DISCUSSION 
Although our Rules of Procedure (Rules) do not include explicit procedures or a 
timeframe for the filing of a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief, the Board has 
historically granted such motions3 and in some cases we have invited amicus briefs 
relating to particular pending legal issues.4 
An amicus brief can enhance our deliberations especially with respect to legal 
issues of state-wide importance. The federal preemption argument asserted by BECS 
229USC§151,etseq. 
3
 See, City of New York, 40 PERB ^3005 (2007); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free Sch 
Dist, 32 PERB 1J3024 (1999); Patchogue-Medford Union Free Sch Dist, 30 PERB 1J3041 
(1997); Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn, 25 PERB 1J3085 (1992); Arlington Cent Sch 
Dist, 25 PERB fi3001 (1992). 
4
 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB P005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in part, 
61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittur, 42 PERB 1J3016 (2009); 
Highland Falls PBA, 42 PERB P030 (2009). 
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and NHA in the present case constitutes such an issue under both the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) and the New York Charter Schools Act of 1998.5 
In their joint motion, NYSUT and UFT state that their proposed amicus brief will 
be limited to the issue of federal preemption. Contrary to the argument by BECS and 
NHA, the motion is not untimely. Furthermore, the mere fact that the legal issue was 
fully briefed before the ALJ is not a legitimate basis for denying leave to file an amicus 
brief with the Board. 
Based upon the foregoing, the motion by NYSUT and UFT for leave to file a joint 
amicus brief is hereby granted on the condition that it is limited to the issue of federal 
preemption raised by BECS and NHA in their exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that NYSUT and UFT may file an original and four 
copies of a joint amicus brief with the Board on or before March 1, 2010 with proof of 
service upon BECS, NHA and the Association. BECS, NHA and the Association may file 
supplemental briefs with the Board on or before March 22, 201G responsive to the 
arguments presented in the joint amicus brief with proof of service upon NYSUT and UFT. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
'<2. 
Sheila S. Col€, Member 
5
 L.1998, c. 4; Education Law §2850, et seq. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27819 
- and -
COUNTY OF ERIE and ERIE COUNTY MEDICAL 
CENTER CORPORATION, 
Respondents. 
SPIVAK LIPTON LLP (NICOLE CUDA PEREZ of counsel), for Charging Party 
COLUCCI & GALLAHER, P.C. (GILLIAN BROWN of counsel), for 
Respondent Erie County Medical Center Corporation 
CHRISTOPHER M. PUTRINO, ESQ., COMMISSIONER OF LABOR 
RELATIONS, for Respondent County of Erie 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Erie County Medical 
Center Corporation (ECMC), to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an 
improper practice charge filed by the New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) 
alleging that the County of Erie (County) and ECMC violated §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). In her decision, the ALJ 
concluded that the County and ECMC violated §§209-a.1(a), (d) and (e) of the Act when 
the wage rate for NYSNA represented per diem registered nurses was unilaterally 
increased.1 
1
 42 PERB 1J4511 (2009). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, ECMC contends that the ALJ erred when she concluded that 
the County and ECMC did not have a compelling reason to unilaterally increase the 
wage rate for per diem registered nurses. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ erred when 
she rejected ECMC's argument that the unilateral wage increase was a reallocation or a 
reclassification of per diem nurses to a higher pay grade consistent with the parties' 
collectively negotiated agreement (agreement).2 NYSNA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision, as modified. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions. 
Since 2001, the per diem registered nurse title has been in the recognized 
collective bargaining unit represented by NYSNA. The parties' last agreement expired 
on December 31, 2004. Appendix S of the expired agreement states that: 
Per diem registered nurses with less than four (4) years of 
verifiable experience will be paid twenty-five dollars ($25.00) 
per hour for hour [sic] worked. Per diem registered nurses 
with more than four (4) years of verifiable experience will be 
paid twenty-eight dollars ($28.00) per hour for each hour 
2
 The County has not filed any exceptions to the ALJ's decision. ECMC has not filed an 
exception to the ALJ's holding that the County and ECMC are joint employers pursuant 
to Public Authorities Law §3629, which states that for purposes of the Act, Erie County 
is the employer of ECMC employees. See also, County of Erie and Erie County 
Medical Center Corp, 39 PERB 1J3036 (2006), confirmed sub nom. Erie County Medical 
Center Corp v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 48 AD3d 1094, 41 PERB 1J7002 (4th 
Dept 2008). The issue of their joint employer status is, therefore, waived. Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) §213.2(b)(4); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB P008 (2007), 
confirmed, Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB H7008 
(Sup Ct Albany County 2007); County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB 
U3006 (2008). 
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worked.3 
Section 7 of the expired agreement includes negotiated provisions with respect to 
the reallocation and the reclassification of positions: 
7.04 Reallocation 
Upon the reallocation of a class of positions to a higher job 
group, the employee or employees serving in the reallocated 
positions shall receive a salary at the increment step in the 
higher job group that corresponds with the increment step in 
which they were serving in the lower group. 
7.05 Reclassification 
When an employee's class title is reclassified to a higher title 
and job group, it shall be considered as a new position and a 
promotion. The salary will then be determined in accordance 
. with the salary rule on promotions.4 
The parties commenced negotiations for a successor agreement in 2004. 
Following a declaration of impasse, they participated in mediation and fact-finding, and 
have continued direct negotiations. Throughout this period, NYSNA proposed 
percentage wage increases for the entire unit including the same percentage increases 
in the hourly rate for per diem registered nurses.5 
During a July 26, 2007 negotiation session, the County and ECMC proposed 
percentage wage increases for registered nurses and a separate proposal to amend 
appendix S to provide that per diem registered nurses with one year of verifiable 
experience would be paid at a $35 hourly rate. NYSNA representatives rejected the 
3
 Joint Exhibit 1, p. 78. 
4
 The salary rule for promotions is set forth in §7.01 of the agreement. It states that 
following a promotion, an employee will receive a salary at an increment step within 
specific ranges for the higher position. Joint Exhibit 1, p. 19. 
.; 5
 Charging Party Exhibits 8, 10, 11, 12. 
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proposals and cancelled two subsequent negotiation sessions in order to consult with 
NYSNA's membership. 
On August 3, 2007, the County and ECMC requested NYSNA to sign a 
memorandum of agreement amending appendix S to permit it to implement its proposed 
rate increase for the per diem registered nurses. After NYSNA refused to sign the 
memorandum, insisting that the issue be resolved in the context of collective negotiations 
over the salary proposals, the County and ECMC unilaterally implemented its proposed 
salary increase for per diem registered nurses on or about August 24, 2007. 
During her testimony, ECMC Vice-President of Human Resources, Kathleen O'Hara 
(O'Hara,) stated that the vagueness of §7.04 of the agreement provides the respondents 
with the necessary contractual authority to unilaterally increase the hourly rate for the per 
diem registered nurses. In addition, she testified that the unilateral increase was 
necessitated by a shortage of nursing staff at ECMC, which she asserted was caused by 
the current hourly rate set forth in appendix S. On cross-examination, however, Ms. 
O'Hara acknowledged that a nursing shortage has existed for a number of years. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin our discussion with ECMC's exception challenging the ALJ's 
determination that respondents did not have a compelling need to unilaterally increase 
the hourly rate for the per diem registered nurses. 
It is well-settled that an employer does not violate §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it 
acts unilaterally with respect to a mandatory subject of negotiation where: (a) there is a 
compelling reason for the employer to act unilaterally at the time when it does so; (b) it 
has negotiated the change in good faith to the point where negotiations are in deadlock; 
Case No. U-27819 - 5 -
and (c) it is willing to continue such negotiations.6 However, compelling need is not a 
defense to an improper practice charge alleging that an employer violated §209-a.1(e) 
of the Act by failing to continue the terms of an expired agreement until a new 
agreement has been negotiated. This statutory provision constitutes an affirmative 
grant of jurisdiction to PERB to remedy an employer's breach of a term of an expired 
collectively negotiated agreement.7 
In the present case, it is undisputed that following the expiration of the 
agreement, the County and ECMC failed to continue the negotiated hourly rate for per 
diem registered nurses set forth in appendix S of the agreement. Therefore, they 
violated §209-a.1(e) of the Act. 
Based upon this finding, we conclude that it is unnecessary for us to reach the 
issue whether respondents met their burden of proof by demonstrating a compelling 
need defense to the alleged violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act. In the present case, the 
remedy for a violation of §209-a.1(d) would have been substantially the same as the 
remedy for respondents' violation of §209-a.1(e).8 
Next, we turn to ECMC's exception challenging the ALJ's rejection of its 
argument that the increase in the hourly rate is permissible based upon the negotiated 
reallocation or reclassification provisions of the agreement. In support of its argument, 
ECMC relies upon precedent holding that a reallocation to a salary grade constitutes a 
V 
6
 Wappingers Cent Sch Dist, 5 PERB 1J3074 (1972); Cohoes City School District, 12 
PERB P113 (1979); Wyandanch Union Free Sch Dist, 15 PERB p 0 6 9 (1982); County 
of Chautauqua, 22 PERB 1J3016 (1989). 
7
 Sullivan County and Sullivan County Sheriff, supra note 2. 
8
 Similarly, it is unnecessary for us to reach the issue whether a compelling need 
constitutes a legitimate defense to an alleged violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act that is 
derivative of a violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. 
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nonmandatory subject of negotiations.9 
Following our review of the evidence, we conclude that the increase in the hourly 
rate for per diem registered nurses is not a reallocation or a reclassification of the title 
under §§7.04 and 7.05 of the agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the per diem 
nurses are not in any assigned job group.10 Moreover, the record does not include 
evidence that the hourly rate increase was imposed in conjunction with the reallocation 
of the title to an identified job group or a reclassification to a higher title and a job group. 
In fact, the proposed August 3, 2007 memorandum of agreement to amend appendix S 
does not reference a reallocation or reclassification of the title. 
Therefore, we modify the ALJ's decision and conclude that respondents violated 
§209-a.1 (e) of the Act by refusing to continue the negotiated hourly rate for per diem 
registered nurses under the parties' agreement. 
To that extent, we deny ECMC's exceptions and affirm the decision of the ALJ,11 
and refrain from determining whether the unilateral increase in this case violates §209-
a. 1(a) and (d) of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County and ECMC shall forthwith: 
9
 See, Evans v Newman, 71 AD2d 240, 12 PERB 1J7022 (3d Dept 1979), affd, 49 NY2d 
904, 13 PERB 1J7004 (1980); County of Tompkins, 15 PERB fl3092 (1982); County of 
Monroe, 29 PERB 1J3060 (1996). 
10
 Joint Exhibit 1, pp. 51-52, 78-79. 
11
 ECMC has not excepted to the ALJ's proposed remedial order, which does not require 
recoupment of the increased wages paid to the per diem registered nurses. ECMC has, 
therefore, waived the issue. Nevertheless, we would affirm the ALJ's conclusion that 
the facts and circumstances of the present case do not present special circumstances 
warranting an order requiring such recoupment. See, Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union 
Free Sch Dist, 22 PERB 1J3037 (1989), enforced, New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd v 
Brookhaven-Comsewogue Union Free Sch Dist, 23 PERB 1J7009 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 1990). 
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1. Rescind the August 2007 increase in the hourly wage rate for the per diem 
registered nurses; 
2. Cease and desist from unilaterally increasing the wages of unit members in 
excess of the terms of the parties' expired agreement until a new agreement 
has been negotiated; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice in the form attached at all locations 
normally used by it to post written communications for unit employees. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
^Q 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Erie and the Erie County Medical Center 
Corporation represented by the New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) that the 
County of Erie and Erie County Medical Center Corporation will rescind the August 2007 
pay increase for the registered nurse per diem title. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Erie and Erie County Medical Center Corporation 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 2790, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27414 
- and -
VILLAGE OF CATSKILL, 
Respondent. 
ENNIO J. CORSI, GENERAL COUNSEL (CHRISTINE CAPUTO 
GRANICH of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (ELAYNE G. GOLD 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Village of Catskill 
(Village) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper 
practice charge filed by the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, 
District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 2790 (Council 82) alleging that the 
Village violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally implemented procedures and restrictions on dual employment 
for unit employees. 
The ALJ concluded that the Village's implementation of the procedures 
and restrictions constituted a unilateral change to a past practice with respect to 
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a mandatory subject, dual employment, in violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Village contends that the ALJ erred in finding an 
enforceable past practice permitting unit members to hold dual law enforcement 
employment based upon an earlier Village written policy. In addition, the Village 
asserts that the subject matter of the charge is nonmandatory for two reasons: a) 
the procedures and restrictions placed on dual employment are a managerial 
prerogative; and b) the Village's concerns about liability resulting from dual 
employment outweigh the interests of Council 82's unit members. Finally, the 
Village urges the Board to overrule Ulster County Sheriff,2 based upon alleged 
workplace and societal changes in the field of law enforcement. 
Council 82 supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, and after careful consideration of 
the arguments by the parties, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The applicable facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated 
here only as necessary to address the Village's exceptions. 
Council 82 represents a unit of 14 employees holding Village law 
enforcement positions. 
Prior to 1991, the Village promulgated Rule 200.85 (Outside Employment) 
and distributed it to unit members as part of the Police Department's policy 
manual. Rule 200.85 stated: 
1
 42 PERB U4522 (2009). 
227PERBP028(1994). 
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The nature of the law enforcement task requires 
Department employees to have the ability to work 
irregular duty schedules which are subject to change 
in meeting deployment needs. Additionally it is 
necessary that an employee have adequate rest to be 
alert during his tour of duty. For these reasons, and 
because certain occupations inherently conflict with 
an employee's primary responsibility to the 
Department, the Department may impose conditions 
on outside employment or may prohibit it altogether. 
Determination of the degree of limitation will be based 
upon the interest of the Department in furthering 
professionalization, protecting the reputation of the 
employee and the service in return for its expenditure 
of resources.3 (emphasis added). 
Prior to 2007, the Village did not impose any procedures, restrictions or 
prohibitions on dual employment by unit employees. Between 1995 and 2007, at 
least four Council 82 unit members held dual employment positions with other 
law enforcement agencies to supplement their income. During this same period, 
Village Police Chief Roger Massey (Massey) held a second position as the Town 
of Athens (Athens) Police Chief. Massey's simultaneous tenure as the Athens 
Police Chief lasted approximately 10 years. In September 2005, David R. Darling 
(Darling) was appointed the new Village Police Chief. 
In October 2006, unit member Christopher Sprague (Sprague), a Village 
patrolman, who was also employed as a patrolman by the Town of Cairo (Cairo), was 
promoted to be the Cairo Police Chief. Following a newspaper story about Sprague's 
promotion, Police Chief Darling ordered Sprague to a meeting. During that meeting, 
Darling expressed his displeasure with respect to Sprague's promotion. 
In the months following the meeting with Sprague, the Village began a review 
of its dual employment policy, as part of a general revision to the police manual. 
3
 Joint Exhibit 1. 
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During that review, Lieutenant Gregory K. Sager (Sager) raised concerns about 
potential Village liability resulting from a lack of adequate police training offered by 
the secondary employer and potential fatigue-related safety problems resulting from 
dual employment.4 During his testimony, Sager admitted that the Village did not 
have a compelling need to change its policy and that the Village's action was not 
precipitated by any actual problems or conflicts resulting from the dual employment 
of unit members.5 Police Chief Darling also testified to concerns over future Village 
liability for the actions of unit members while employed by another law enforcement 
agency. According to Darling, the Village could be sued for providing inadequate 
training if one of its officers, while working for another police department, improperly 
discharged his or her firearm. His fear of potential litigation is exacerbated by 
concerns over the applicable qualifications for holding a position in other police 
departments, and the training, if any, provided by those departments. 
Following a two-month review, the Village issued a Department Directive 
Number G07-001 (Directive) entitled "Secondary Employment of Full Time 
Employees" on February 9, 2007. The Directive imposes a series of procedures 
and restrictions on dual employment by unit members including: 
a) all requests for dual employment are subject to the Police Chiefs 
approval; 
b) an employee must make a written request and receive written 
approval from the Police Chief prior to accepting or engaging in 
any form of dual employment; 
c) dual law enforcement employment is prohibited except for 
4
 Transcript, p. 44. 
5
 Transcript, pp. 50-51. 
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employees who held such positions as of February 10, 2007;6 
d) dual employment can not interfere or conflict with an employee's ability 
to efficiently perform his or her Village job duties; 
e) employees cannot work more than 20 hours per week in a second job; 
In May 2007, the Village, under the new policy, denied a unit member's request 
for permission to engage, in non-law enforcement work at a concert for two days. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with the Village's exception challenging the ALJ's finding of an 
enforceable past practice with respect to dual employment. 
In Chenango Forks Central School District,7 we restated the. applicable test 
for determining whether an enforceable^past practice exists under the Act. Under 
the test, there must be a showing of an unequivocal and continuous practice for a 
sufficient period of time, under the circumstances, to create a reasonable 
expectation among the affected unit employees that the practice would continue. A 
reasonable expectation is something that will "be presumed from its duration with 
consideration of the specific circumstances under which the practice has existed."8 
Following a prima facie showing, an employer may present a defense seeking to 
demonstrate that it lacked either actual or constructive knowledge.9 
In the present case, the Village does not dispute that it had actual 
6
 However, Village police supervisory personnel are prohibited from holding dual 
law enforcement employment in which they have a command rank or have other 
supervisory duties and responsibilities. 
7
 40 PERB 1J3012(2007). 
8
 40 PERB 1J3012 at 3047. 
9
 FIT, 41 PERB 1J3010 (2008), confd, FIT v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 68 
AD3d 605, 42 PERB H7011 (1st Dept 2009). 
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knowledge of the practice of unit members holding secondary law enforcement 
jobs. Instead, it relies on its earlier written policy, Rule 200.85, which it contends 
constitutes a reservation of rights granting it a right to unilaterally prohibit, or 
impose conditions on, dual employment for unit employees. Alternatively, it 
asserts that the Directive is a mere clarification of the prior written policy. We 
disagree with both propositions. 
In Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New Yor/c,10 
we concluded that 
when a subsequently enforceable practice is 
inconsistent with an employer's written policy, the 
employer can no longer rely on that policy to 
unilaterally end or modify the practice without 
violating §209-a.1(d) of the Act. Where, however, 
there is evidence establishing that the contours of the 
practice include an employer's unfettered discretion to 
continue or to modify the practice consistent with a 
prior explicit reservation or evidence establishing an 
explicit waiver to negotiate by the employee 
organization, there would be no enforceable 
practice.11 (footnotes omitted) 
Furthermore, in New York City Transit Authority,™ we emphasized that we 
will strictly construe policy-based reservation of rights because, unlike contract 
reversion, an employer's policy does not stem from an employer satisfying its 
duty to negotiate under the Act. 
Following our review of the record, we affirm the ALJ's finding that Council 
82 demonstrated an enforceable past practice under the Act with respect to dual 
IU42PERBP019(2009). 
11
 Supra note 10, 42 PERB P019 at 3069. 
12
 42 PERB H3012(2009). 
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employment. The evidence establishes that for a dozen years prior to the 
implementation of the Directive, there has been an unequivocal and continuous 
practice of unit members holding dual employment with other law enforcement 
agencies. Indeed, for much of the same period, Village Police Chief Massey 
held secondary employment as Athens Police Chief. 
Furthermore, the record demonstrates that the Village did not apply Rule 
200.85 to limit the contours of this practice in any manner. The evidence 
establishes that there were no restrictions on off-duty employment by unit 
members. The scope and length of the practice, including Massey's own dual 
employment for 10 years, demonstrate the Village's abandonment of the 
discretion described in its earlier written policy. 
Contrary to the Village's contention, the Directive does not constitute a mere 
clarification of Rule 200.85. In fact, the Directive imposed new procedures, prohibitions 
and restrictions that go well beyond clarifying or "fine-tuning" the earlier policy. The 
Directive states expressly that it constitutes a replacement of Rule 200.85.13 
Next, we turn to the Village's assertion that the subject of dual 
employment is nonmandatory under the Act. It is well-settled that, in general, 
limitations on an employee's use of non-working time to engage in dual 
employment are mandatory subjects under the Act.14 Nevertheless, the Board 
will apply a balancing test to determine whether a unilateral promulgation or 
13
 Joint Exhibit 2. 
14
 Local 589, IAFF, 16 PERB 1J3030 (1983); Ulster County Sheriff, supra note 2; 
City of Buffalo (Police Dept), 23 PERB 1J3050 (1990); Hewlett-Wood mere Union 
Free Sen Dist, 38 PERB 1J3006 (2005); City of Albany, 42 PERB 1J3005 (2009); 
NYCTA, supra note 12. 
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alteration of a work rule violates the Act. As we stated in City of Albany: 
In applying this balancing test, we examine the record 
to determine whether there is preponderance of 
credible evidence to demonstrate that the employer's 
need for a particular mission-related work rule 
outweighs the effect that the rule has on the 
employees' terms and conditions of employment. 
The mere fact that a work rule has a relationship to 
an employer's mission does not permit an employer 
to act unilaterally in any manner it deems appropriate. 
Rather, an employer can unilaterally impose a work 
rule only to the extent that the unilateral action does 
not significantly or unnecessarily intrude on the 
protected interests of bargaining unit employees 
under the Act. Therefore, under the balancing test the 
burden rests with the employer to demonstrate that 
the new work rule does not go beyond what is 
necessary to further its mission.15 (footnotes omitted) 
In the present case, we conclude that the Village has not satisfied its 
burden of demonstrating that the provisions of the Directive do not go beyond 
what is necessary to further that mission. 
It is not disputed that the Directive places substantial limitations on the 
ability of unit members in their use of non-work time, including impairing their 
ability to supplement their income. Despite the lack of any demonstrated 
problems or conflicts resulting from secondary employment by unit members, the 
Directive prohibits such dual employment prospectively, and places other 
substantial restrictions and procedures on secondary employment. 
We are not persuaded by the Village's argument that its concerns over 
potential civil liability outweigh the interests of Council 82's unit members. In 
Ulster County Sheriff,™ we rejected a similar argument by a respondent that dual 
15
 Supra note 14, 42 PERB ff3005 at 3007. 
16
 Supra note 2. 
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law enforcement employment is nonmandatory based upon fear of future potential 
civil liability that may result from off-duty employee conduct while performing 
secondary law enforcement duties. We concluded in that case that potential 
liability is primarily an economic concern that can be resolved as part of the 
collective bargaining process. 
Although the Village urges us to reverse our holding in Ulster County Sheriff, it 
has not presented any facts, studies or expert testimony to support its broad 
assertion that the field of law enforcement has substantially changed since we issued 
Ulster County Sheriff warranting reconsideration of our earlier holding. Similarly, it 
has not presented any proof supporting its related argument that secondary 
employment results in safety problems caused by fatigue among unit members. 
Therefore, we find no basis for overruling our decision in Ulster County 
Sheriff. The issue of potential civil liability for the Village, resulting from dual 
employment by unit members, remains an economic issue that is subject to 
negotiations under the Act.17 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Villages exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Village of Catskill forthwith: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of 
Directive Number G07-001 entitled "Secondary Employment of Full 
Time Employees" for employees in the Village of Catskill Police 
17
 The Village's reliance upon precedent upholding limitations placed upon dual 
employment in law enforcement is misplaced. See, Flood v Kennedy, 12 NY2d 
345 (1963); Dake vBowen, 134 AD2d 684 (3d Dept 1988); Treifa v Vill of Centre 
Island, 54 AD2d 985 (2d Dept 1976). Those decisions do not address the 
negotiability of the subject under the Act. 
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Department represented by Council 82; 
2. Compensate and/or make whole unit employees for any loss of pay or 
benefits resulting from the enforcement or implementation of Directive 
Number G07-001, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate written information to unit employees. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
!2^ 
Sheila S. ColeTMember 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Village of Catskill in the unit 
represented by the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, 
District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 2790 that the Village of 
Catskill wi l l : 
1. immediately rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of 
Directive Number G07-001 entitled "Secondary Employment of Full Time 
Employees" for employees in the Village of Catskill Police Department 
represented by Council 82; and 
2. compensate and/or make whole unit employees for any loss of pay or 
benefits resulting from the enforcement or implementation Directive 
G07-001, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Village of Catskill 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, 
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
CASE NOS. C-5723 & C-5724 
- and -




LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD 
OF TEAMSTERS, 
Intervenor. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ. for Petitioner 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (ERNEST R. STOLZER of counsel), for 
Employer 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C. (BARRY J. PEEK of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to the Board on exceptions filed by the United Federation of 
Police Officers, Inc. (Federation) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing two certification/decertification petitions seeking the fragmentation of four 
positions from a blue collar unit of Town of Islip (Town) employees represented by 
Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters): Airport Security Guard, 
Senior Airport Security Guard (Security Guards), Park Ranger I and Park Ranger II 
Case Nos. C-5723 & C-5724 -2 
(Park Rangers).1 The Federation seeks fragmentation based solely upon the law 
enforcement duties performed by employees in the four positions. 
The ALJ dismissed both petitions concluding that the employees in the positions 
at-issue do not perform job duties that are exclusively or primarily the prevention and 
detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of New York.2 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Federation asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
Security Guards and Forest Rangers do not exclusively or primarily engage in general 
law enforcement duties. The Teamsters support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the respective 
arguments of the parties, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated here 
only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
Since 1970, the Teamsters has been certified as the exclusive negotiating 
representative of a unit of Town blue collar employees.3 For approximately 20 years, 
the unit has included the Security Guards and Park Rangers. Within the blue collar 
unit, which is comprised of approximately 498 employees, there are 36 employees in 
1
 Case No. C-5723 seeks fragmentation of the Airport Security Guard and Senior 
Airport Security Guard positions. Case No. C-5724 seeks fragmentation of the Park 
Ranger I and Park Ranger II positions. 
2
 42 PERB 1J4007 (2009). 
3
 See, Town oflslip,3 PERB 1J3085.6 (1970); Town of Islip, 15 PERB TJ3000.48 (1982). 
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the Security Guard and Park Ranger positions. 
Security Guards 
In 2002, the Legislature amended the Criminal Procedure Law §2.10 to 
designate Security Guards as peace officers for the limited purpose of providing 
security at Long Island MacArthur Airport when acting 
pursuant to their duties as such, and such authority being 
specifically limited to the grounds of said airport. However, 
nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed to authorize such 
officer to carry, possess, report or dispose of a firearm 
unless the appropriate license therefore has been issued 
pursuant to section 400.00 of the penal law.4 
The primary responsibility of Security Guards is to provide security at Long Island 
MacArthur Airport (Airport). They are assigned to specific posts at the Airport and are 
required to patrol those areas. Their duties include securing the Airport's air operations 
area, screening access of employees and passengers to secure areas,' responding to 
emergencies and disturbances, enforcing the Vehicle & Traffic Law, and acting in 
response to requests for assistance involving airport and passenger safety. While on 
duty, Security Guards are armed, and wear bulletproof vests. 
At times, during the course of their duties, Security Guards detain, search and 
arrest individuals at the Airport for possession of drugs, weapons and large amounts of 
cash. However, most individuals detained by Security Guards are issued a summons 
and released. The decision to arrest, rather than issue a summons, is made by police 
officers with the Suffolk County Police Department, which maintains a 24-hour 
presence at the Airport. 
4
 L 2002, c 321; Crim Pro Law §2.10(75). 
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Security Guards receive training consistent with Criminal Procedure Law §2.30. 
In addition, they receive supplemental training from and interact with various federal law 
enforcement agencies. 
Park Rangers 
Park Rangers are peace officers with the authority "to issue appearance tickets, 
simplified traffic informations, simplified parks informations and simplified environmental 
conservation informations."5 Their primary responsibilities are to guard and patrol the 
Town's parks, marinas, and related facilities. In conjunction with those primary 
responsibilities, they enforce provisions of the Town Code by issuing appearance 
tickets. In addition, on an infrequent basis, they issue appearance tickets for violations 
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, the Environmental Conservation Law and the Penal 
Law. They also respond to calls for assistance, administer first aid, and provide 
information to members of the public. 
While on duty, Park Rangers wear uniforms with a Town insignia and bulletproof 
vests. In addition, they carry various equipment including a baton and handcuffs but 
they are not armed. Their patrols are conducted on foot and in specially marked 
vehicles. Park Rangers receive peace officer training. 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-established under the Act that fragmentation is appropriate for public 
employees "that hold police officer titles or hold a title that has been granted police 
officer status by the Legislature and whose exclusive or predominant duties are the 
5
 Crim Pro Law §2.10(9). 
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enforcement of the State's general criminal laws."6 
In the present case, Security Guards and Park Rangers are not police officers, 
and they have not been granted police officer powers by the Legislature. Rather, they 
are peace officers with explicitly narrow law enforcement authority.7 
As we emphasized in State of New York (Division of Parole), there is a 
fundamental difference between the law enforcement powers and authority of a police 
officer and a peace officer: 
There are a multitude of titles assigned to perform important 
law enforcement related duties involving public safety. 
However, whether a position has been granted police officer 
status under the CPL §1.20(34) remains an initial factor to 
be considered in determining whether fragmentation is 
appropriate based on the performance of those duties. The 
Legislature, in drafting the Criminal Procedure Law, has 
established a clear dichotomy between the respective scope 
of law enforcement authority of police officers and peace 
officers confirming the unique authority and responsibilities 
of individuals with police officer status.8 
By definition, a police officer is an employee with broad legal authority to enforce 
6
 State of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB P011 at 3042 (2007). See also, City 
of Amsterdam, 10 PERB1J3031 (1977). Vill of Skaneateles, 16 PERB P070 (1983). 
7
 Crim Pro Law §§2.10(9), 2.10(75), 2.20. 
8
 Supra note 6, 40 PERB at 3042. In that case we expressly declined to follow County 
of Rockland, 32 PERB P074 (1999), confirmed sub nom. County of Rockland v New 
York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 34 PERB 1J7013 (Sup Ct, Albany County 2001), affd, 295 
AD2d 790, 35 PERB fl7013 (3rd Dept 2002) and State of New York, 34 PERB P038 
(2001) to the extent those decisions suggest that law enforcement employees without 
police officer powers and authority should be fragmented into a separate unit. 
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the general criminal laws of New York.9 In contrast, the law enforcement authority of a 
peace officer is much more limited.10 
Even if Security Guards and Park Rangers had police officer powers, the record 
in the present case demonstrates that their duties are not exclusively or primarily the 
prevention and detection of crime, and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of 
New York.11 
The security duties of Security Guards are limited to the Airport and those duties 
are not predominantly the enforcement of New York's criminal law. Although Security 
Guards carry weapons and have certain powers to detain, search and arrest individuals 
at the Airport, they primarily issue summons and release the individuals detained. 
Furthermore, the training they receive relates to their role as peace officers and their 
responsibilities at the Airport. Similarly, the primary duties of Park Rangers are to 
provide security for the Town's parks and marinas and to enforce the Town Code. The 
fact that they wear uniforms, conduct patrols in specially marked vehicles, and receive 
9
 Civ Serv Law §58(3) defines the term police officer as an employee "who is 
responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the 
general criminal laws of the state...." 
10
 In its exceptions, the Federation asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
Security Guards and Park Rangers, as peace officers, do not have the authority to 
effectuate an arrest or search warrant. We do not need to determine this issue because 
whether peace officers have such authority does not change the fundamental 
differences between police officers and peace officers created by the Legislature in the 
Criminal Procedure Law. 
11
 See, County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB 1J3031, at 3069 (1996), 
confirmed sub nom. County of Erie v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 247 AD2d 671, 
31 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dept 1998). 
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peace officer training does not constitute evidence warranting their fragmentation under 
our precedent. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Federation's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Federation's petitions are dismissed. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Gnairman 
^ X / ^ g r . 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
J2. 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA FALLS POLICE CLUB, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-27834 
- and -
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM E. GRANDE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
CRAIG H. JOHNSON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (CHRISTOPHER M. 
MAZUR of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Niagara Falls 
(City) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by the Niagara Falls Police Club, Inc. (Police Club) alleging 
that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it refused to engage in negotiations for an appeal procedure from an initial City 
determination that a unit employee is not in compliance with the City's residency 
requirement. 
On a stipulated record, the ALJ concluded that the subject matter of the charge 
constitutes a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act, and that the City violated 
the Act by refusing the Police Club's request to negotiate the subject.1 
1
 42 PERB 1J4532 (2009). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the ALJ's conclusion that an appeal procedure from an initial 
determination over a unit member's non-compliance with the residency requirement is a 
mandatory subject of negotiations. In addition, it asserts that the ALJ erroneously ruled 
that the Police Club had made a request to the City to negotiate an appeal procedure. 
Finally, the City challenges the ALJ's rejection of its argument that the charge is 
untimely. The Police Club supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision. They are repeated 
here only as necessary to address the exceptions. 
The Police Club represents a unit of Niagara Falls Police Department employees 
including uniformed police officers, detectives, communication technicians and police 
dispatchers. The City and the Police Club are parties to a collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement) for the period January 1, 2004-December 31, 2007, which does 
not include a zipper clause. Pursuant to §12.08 of the agreement, either party may 
serve written notice upon the other if it desires to amend, modify or terminate the 
agreement. 
In 1984, the Niagara Falls City Council enacted Local Law #7 (Local Law) 
requiring each newly hired employee to become a City resident within six months of 
initial employment. In June 1996, the Niagara Falls City Council enacted legislation 
amending the Local Law. The Local Law, as amended, sets forth a procedure to be 
followed after the City Administrator obtains information indicating that an employee is 
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in breach of the residency requirement. Under that statutory procedure, the employee 
is sent a written notice and is provided an opportunity to respond. If the employee fails 
to respond or the response is deemed inadequate by the City Administrator, the Local 
Law requires the scheduling of a hearing to determine whether the employee is a non-
resident. Upon a determination by the City Administrator that the employee is a non-
resident, the employeeis deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his or her position. 
The City Administrator is obligated to file a report with the City Council setting forth the 
allegations against the employee and the disposition of those allegations. The Local 
Law does not include an appeal procedure to challenge a determination by the City 
Administrator that a unit member is not in compliance with the residency requirement. 
Since 1984, the City has not invoked the notice and hearing procedures under 
the Local Law against unit employees. However, it has required unit members to 
provide notification of a change in address. 
On May 11, 2007, the City issued a new directive to all City employees, including 
Police Club unit members, requiring them to sign and return a form certifying 
compliance with the residency requirement of the Local Law and certifying their current 
residence. 
Following issuance of the new directive, counsel for the Police Club sent a letter, 
dated May 29, 2007, to the City's Human Resources Director. In his letter, the Police 
Club's counsel requested the City to rescind its new directive on the grounds that 
requiring unit members to prepare and return the new certification form constitutes a 
mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act. In addition, the May 29, 2007 letter 
stated that an appeal procedure with respect to an initial determination of non-
compliance with the residency requirement constitutes a mandatory subject. In support 
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of its position, the Police Club attached to its letter a decision by an ALJ concluding that 
such a review procedure is mandatory.2 The letter requested negotiations over the 
issues raised in the letter along with impact negotiations over the City's decision to 
begin enforcing the residency requirement. The City did not respond to the May 29, 
2007 letter or counsel's June 2007 follow-up letter. After the City threatened to 
discipline unit members for failing to comply with the new residency certification 
requirement, the Police Club filed its charge. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In its charge, the Police Club alleges, inter alia, that the City violated §209-a.1(d) 
of the Act by unilaterally imposing the residency certification form on unit members, and 
by refusing to negotiate a review procedure from an initial determination that an 
employee is not in compliance with the residency requirement.3 The City filed an 
answer setting forth five defenses; the answer does not, however, allege that the charge 
is untimely. 
During the processing of the charge, the parties reached a partial settlement. 
Under that settlement, the City rescinded the directive requiring unit members to submit 
the residency certification form and the City agreed to take certain affirmative steps to 
remedy its prior efforts at enforcing the directive. In exchange, the Police Club withdrew 
that portion of the charge that relates to the residency certification form. 
The parties' stipulation states that the ALJ should determine the "remaining 
issue" raised by the charge: "whether the City has violated the Act by failing to negotiate 
the procedure by which unit members may appeal an initial determination by the City as 
2
 See, City of Schenectady, 22 PERB 1J4527 (1989). 
3
 The charge does not allege that the City violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act for refusing to 
negotiate the impact of the City's decision to begin enforcing the residency requirement. 
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to whether or not they are in compliance with the residency policy—based upon this 
) Stipulated Record." 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the City contends that Public Officers Law §30,4(3) renders the 
subject matter of the charge nonmandatory under the Act. We disagree. 
The Board has held that the imposition of a residency requirement for police 
officers subject to Public Officers Law §30.4(3) is nonmandatory because it constitutes 
the exercise of a managerial prerogative.4 By its explicit terms, Public Officers Law 
§30.4(3) is applicable to a police force consisting of "less than two hundred full-time 
members." In the present case, however, the stipulated record does not include an 
essential fact necessary to support the City's argument that unit members are subject to 
that state law: the police force has fewer than 200 full-time members.5 Therefore, the 
! City has failed to demonstrate that the law is applicable to Police Club unit members. 
Even if we found Public Officers Law §30.4(3) to be applicable, the statute does 
not render the subject matter of the charge nonmandatory. The plain and clear 
language of the statute grants certain localities the right to unilaterally impose a 
residency requirement on its police officers. It is silent with respect to an appeal 
procedure from an employer's initial determination of non-compliance with the residency 
4
 City of Mount Vernon, 18 PERB 1J3020 (1985); Salamanca Police Unit, CSEA, 12 
PERB 1J3079 (1979). Based upon our ruling today, it is unnecessary for us to reach the 
City's argument that a residency requirement imposed upon police officers subject to 
Public Officers Law §30.4(3) constitutes a prohibited subject of negotiations. See, 
Respondent's Brief in Support of Exceptions, pp. 11-12. 
5
 As we recently reiterated in Niagara Charter Sch, 42 PERB P036 (2008), parties have 
the same level of responsibility to ensure a complete record whether through a 
stipulation of facts or through the presentation of evidence at a hearing. 
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requirement.6 Consistent with precedent finding that a contractual alternative to judicial 
review under CPLR Article 78 is a mandatory subject of negotiations,7 we conclude that 
an appeal procedure from an initial determination that an employee is not in compliance 
with a residency requirement is a mandatory subject. Simply put, such a determination 
adversely impacts an employee's terms and conditions of employment.8 
Next, we turn to the City's argument that the Police Club failed to request 
negotiations over an appeal procedure. Based upon our review of the May 29, 2007 
letter from the counsel for the Police Club, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the Police 
Club requested negotiations over the subject. Among the issues specifically addressed 
by the letter is the negotiability of a procedure to review the City's determination of non-
compliance. In the letter's penultimate full paragraph, counsel expressly requests the 
scheduling of a meeting to negotiate the issues discussed in the letter. To the extent 
that the City claims that the letter is ambiguous, it had a reasonable opportunity to seek 
clarification prior to refusing to negotiate. 
Finally, we reject the City's assertion that the charge is untimely because it was 
filed more than four months after the enactment of the Local Law. The City waived the 
6
 The statute also does not touch upon the procedures to be followed in rendering an 
initial determination with respect to compliance with the residency requirement. 
However, we do not reach the issue whether the subject of initial determination 
procedures is mandatory because the charge is limited to the negotiability of an appeal 
procedure. See, Respondent's Brief in Support of Exceptions, p. 9. 
7
 See, Watertown PBA, 30 PERB 1J3072 (1997), confirmed, City of Watertown v New 
York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 31 PERB Tf7013 (Sup Ct Albany County 1998), revd, 263 
AD2d 797, 32 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dept 1999), revd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB 1J7007 (2000); 
CityofMiddletown, 42 PERB fl3022 (2009). 
City of Schenectady, supra note 2. 
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issue of timeliness by not pleading it as an affirmative defense.9 Furthermore, the four-
month time period began to run after the City refused Police Club's request to negotiate 
the subject and not when the Local Law was enacted. As the City concedes, the Local 
Law is silent with respect to an appeal procedure from an initial determination and it is 
undisputed that the City did not previously seek to enforce the Local Law. 
Based upon the foregoing, the City's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ's finding that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by refusing the Police 
Club's request to negotiate an appeal procedure is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the City: 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to engage in negotiations with the 
Police Club over a procedure to review an initial determination that 
an employee is not in compliance with the residency requirement; 
and 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 n 
Albany, New York f\ j~ J J j/K 
/ /Jerome Lefl^owitz/^hairman 
Robert S. Rite, Member 
S£?Q.:. W<2-
^ Sheila S. Cole^lvlember 
Rules of Procedure, §§204.3(c)(2) and 212.4(1). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Niagara Falls (City) in the 
bargaining unit represented by the Niagara Falls Police Club, Inc. (Police 
Club) that the City will not refuse to engage in good faith negotiations with 
the Police Club over an appeal procedure to review an initial determination 




City of Niagara Falls 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF GARDEN CITY 
CASE NO. DR-125 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
MEYER, SUOZZI, ENGLISH & KLEIN, P.C., (RICHARD S. CORENTHAL of 
counsel), for Petitioner 
CULLEN AND DYKMAN LLP (GERARD FISHBERG of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Professional Firefighters 
Association of Nassau County, Local 1588, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Association) to a 
recommended declaratory ruling and decision1 by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing a petition for a declaratory ruling (petition) filed by the Association. 
On October 10, 2008, the Association filed a petition, pursuant to §210.1 of the 
Rules of Procedure (Rules), seeking a declaratory ruling that: a) the mandatory 
retirement age and the twenty-five (25) years length of service requirements in Article 
XI, §2(a) of the expired agreement (agreement) between the Association and the Village 
of Garden City (Village) are void as a matter of law and are prohibited subjects of 
negotiations under the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act); and b) the 
Association is not obligated under the Act to engage in negotiations for the deletion of 
the prohibited subjects. 
1
 42 PERB 1J6601 (2009). 
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On May 18, 2007, the Village filed a response seeking dismissal of the petition 
on the grounds that the petition does not raise a cognizable issue under the Rules and 
that it constitutes an attempt by the Association to circumvent its duty to negotiate under 
the Act. 
In lieu of a hearing, the parties stipulated to the record, which contains the 
petition and response along with a stipulation of facts and exhibits. 
On May 19, 2009, the ALJ issued a recommended declaratory ruling and 
decision (decision) dismissing the petition for a declaratory ruling on the ground that it 
did not raise a genuine dispute over the negotiability of a proposal under §210.1 (a) of 
the Rules. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing the 
petition on the grounds that the petition raises a question with respect to the scope of 
negotiations under the Rules, and that the ALJ applied an erroneous legal standard in 
concluding that she is without authority to determine the issues raised in the petition. In 
addition, the Association asserts that the ALJ erred in her findings that the Village has 
not made a relevant proposal and that neither party has refused to negotiate a proposal. 
Finally, the Association contends that the objectionable provisions in Article XI, §2(a) of 
the agreement are void as a matter of law pursuant to §201.4 of the Act, Retirement and 
Social Security Law §470 and New York State Constitution, Article 5, §7. 
The Village supports the ALJ's decision dismissing the petition. In the 
alternative, it contends that the provisions in Article XI, §2(a) are mandatorily negotiable. 
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Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we affirm the ALJ's recommended decision. 
FACTS 
The relevant stipulated facts are simple and straightforward. 
Article XI, §2 of the parties' agreement states: 
Village will provide the improved career retirement plan of 
Section 375-i of the Retirement & Social Security Law for 
employees who have twenty-five (25) years of service and 
have reached their 55th birthday. Employees agree by such 
election to retire at age sixty-two (62) and execute an 
appropriate form to this effect, if required. Any employee 
who makes this election and fails to retire by age sixty-two 
(62) shall be terminated and in the event the employee 
grieves and arbitrates this termination, the arbitrator shall 
sustain the discharge if he finds the employee made the 
election and has reached sixty-two (62) years of age. 
The provision was originally added to the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreements pursuant to a memorandum of agreement, dated October 18, 1986. 
On July 25, 2008, the Association's counsel sent a letter to the Village's counsel 
confirming the scheduling of the first negotiation session between the parties for a 
successor agreement. In that letter, the Association's counsel stated that Article XI, §2 
of the expired agreement 
violates the New York State Retirement and Social Security 
Law and should be stricken from the CBA. Since the age 62 
mandatory requirement provision is illegal, we do not believe 
that its removal is subject to collective bargaining and any 
negotiations regarding this provision would be prohibited 
under the Taylor Law. Please advise us within ten days if the 
Village disagrees with our position and is taking the position 
that removal of the age 62 mandatory retirement provision 
from the CBA must be negotiated. Failing to hear from you 
within ten days, we will have no choice but to assume that 
the Village is insisting that Local 1588 is required to 
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negotiate the removal of the age 62 mandatory retirement 
provision from the CBA. 
Five days later, the City's counsel sent a letter that confirmed the date for the 
commencement of negotiations and responded to the Association's counsel's letter with 
respect to the contested contractual provision: 
The remainder of your letter is puzzling to me. As you know, 
we have a Nassau Supreme Court Decision upholding the 
mandatory age 62 retirement for members covered by the 
375-i retirement plan. I am confused by your statement that 
the age 62 mandatory retirement provision is illegal and its 
removal from the CBA is not subject to negotiations. Please 
let me know what you base that on. It is our position that the 
Village is not requesting any change in the current provision 
and, therefore, there is no need for the Village to characterize 
this provision as mandatory, non-mandatory or illegal. 
On August 29, 2008, the Association's counsel sent another letter to the Village's 
attorney clarifying the Association's position. In his letter, the Association's counsel 
contended that the contract provision is void because it sets a mandatory retirement 
age at variance with the applicable mandatory retirement age of 70 for a Retirement and 
Social Security Law §375-i retirement plan, which is set forth in Retirement and Social 
Security Law §370(b). In addition, he asserted that the agreement's eligibility 
requirement of 25 years of service is inconsistent with the 20 years service requirement 
set forth in Retirement and Social Security Law §375-i. In support of the Association's 
argument that the removal of the void provisions is a prohibited subject, counsel cited 
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§201.4 of the Act.2 
During the exchange of proposals at the second bargaining session, on October 7, 
2008, the Association's list of proposals included the following: 
With respect to the age sixty-two mandatory retirement age 
requirement and twenty-five years of service requirement 
applicable to employees enrolled in Section 375-i of the 
Retirement & Social Security Law contained in Article XI, 
Section 2(a) of the collective bargaining [sic], Local 1588 
makes no proposal inasmuch as these requirements are 
void as a matter of law and should be deleted from the 
agreement. The Village is requested to confirm that these 
requirements are deleted from the agreement. 
In addition, during the bargaining session the Association reiterated that the 
mandatory retirement age and years of service set forth in Article XI, §2(a) of the 
agreement are illegal and void and requested that the Village confirm that those 
requirements will be deleted from the agreement. In response the Village stated that the 
issues were negotiable. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 210.1(a) of the Rules permits any person, employee organization or 
employer to file a petition for a declaratory ruling "with respect to the applicability of the 
act to it or any other person, employee organization or employer or with respect to the 
2
 Section 201.4 of the Act states: 
The term "terms and conditions of employment" means 
salaries, wages, hours and other terms and conditions of 
employment provided, however, that such term shall not 
include any benefits provided by or to be provided by a 
public retirement system, or payments to a fund or insurer to 
provide an income for retirees, or payment to retirees or their 
beneficiaries. No such retirement benefits shall be 
negotiated pursuant to this article, and any benefits so 
negotiated shall be void. 
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scope of negotiations under the act." Thus, the subject matter that can be resolved in 
the context of a petition for declaratory ruling is limited to whether an individual or entity 
is subject to the Act or whether a particular negotiation subject is mandatory, 
nonmandatory or prohibited.3 
In Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, lnc,A we affirmed 
the dismissal of a petition for a declaratory ruling that sought an interpretation of a 
provision in a collectively negotiated agreement between the public employer and 
another employee organization because the subject matter of the petition was beyond 
the stated purposes for the declaratory ruling process under the Rules. 
More recently,.in Niagara Charter School,5 we affirmed the dismissal of a petition 
for a declaratory ruling by an employer that sought an adjudication regarding the 
interplay between the representation procedures under the Act and Rules and the 
provisions of the New York Charter Schools Act of 1998.6 In affirming the ALJ's 
dismissal of the petition in that case, we stated: 
The purpose of the declaratory ruling process is to provide a 
less adversarial means than an improper practice charge for 
resolving justiciable issues regarding the subject matters set 
forth in §210.1 (a) of the Rules. It was never intended to be a 
substitute for a declaratory judgment action nor as a means 
of obtaining determinations as to whether an employer has a 
statutory duty to negotiate with an employee organization 
under the Act.7 (footnotes omitted) 
3
 City of Pittsburgh, 32 PERB P014 (1999). 
4
 40 PERB fl3019(2007). 
5
 41 PERB 1J6501 (2008). 
6
 Education Law §2850, etseq. 
7
 Supra note 5, 41 PERB at 6503. 
Case No. DR-125 -7-
In the present case, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the Association's petition 
does not raise a justiciable issue under §210.1 (a) of the Rules. Consistent with Board 
precedent, the ALJ correctly found that the Association's petition does not seek a 
declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability of the Act or with respect to the 
negotiability of a specific proposal. The primary purpose of the Association's petition is 
not a negotiability determination. Instead, it seeks an administrative legal determination 
as to the legality of Article XI, §2, which has been in the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreements since 1986. To render such a determination would require the Board to 
interpret various provisions of the Retirement and Social Security Law and the New 
York State Constitution. While this legal, issue may be of importance to the parties, the 
declaratory ruling process was never intended to be a means for resolving this type of 
legal issue, which is external to the Act, without the pendency of a related negotiation 
proposal. Nothing in our decision, however, precludes the Association or Village from 
seeking a judicial declaration as to the respective rights of the parties pursuant to CPLR 
§3001. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the petition. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
/MmC 
Jerome Lefi^bwitz.^fhairman 
1 / *» 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
<2, 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
) STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VICTOR C. BUCHALSKI, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-28360 
- and -
UNITED STEELWORKERS, LOCAL 9434-00, 
Respondent, 
- and -
CITY OF NIAGARA FALLS, 
Employer. 
SANDERS & SANDERS (HARVEY P. SANDERS of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
CREIGHTON, PEARCE, JOHNSEN & GIROUX (E. JOSEPH GIROUX, JR. 
of counsel), for Respondent 
CRAIG H. JOHNSON, CORPORATION COUNSEL (CHRISTOPHER M. 
MAZUR of counsel), for Employer City of Niagara Falls 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Victor C. Buchalski 
(Buchalski) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by Buchalski against the United Steelworkers, Local 9434-00 
(Steelworkers) alleging that the Steelworkers violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
Employee's Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to take action to challenge the 
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termination of his contractual health insurance benefits in 2007 following his successful 
application for disability retirement with the New York State and Local Retirement 
System. 
The Steelworkers filed an answer denying that it violated the Act and asserting 
timeliness as an affirmative defense. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge concluding 
that Buchalski's allegations are untimely pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules).1 In the alternative, the ALJ determined that Buchalski failed to 
establish a breach of the duty of fair representation because the Steelworkers' conduct 
was not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Buchalski contends that the ALJ made errors of law and fact in 
concluding that the charge is untimely under the Rules. In addition, he contends that 
the ALJ erred in finding that the Steelworkers acted reasonably when it concluded that 
Buchalski's proposed claim challenging the termination of his health insurance lacked 
merit. The Steelworkers support the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record, consideration of the parties' arguments and 
application of relevant precedent, we deny Buchalski's exceptions, and affirm the ALJ's 
dismissal of the charge. 
FACTS 
For approximately 20 years, Buchalski was an employee of the City of Niagara 
Falls (City). In May 2002, he suffered a compensable injury at work for which he 
1
 42 PERB 1J4563 (2009). 
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received supplemental workers' compensation benefits under the parties' collectively 
negotiated agreement (agreement). After a one-year leave of absence, the City 
terminated him from employment, effective June 2003, pursuant to Civil Service Law 
§71, and it cancelled his contractual health insurance benefits under the City-
Steelworkers' collectively negotiated agreement. 
In 2003, counsel for the Steelworkers expressed an initial written reservation 
about the merits of a grievance challenging the cancellation of Buchalski's health 
insurance benefits under the agreement. However, three days later, the same counsel 
reversed her opinion, and recommended that a grievance be filed on behalf of Buchalski 
alleging a violation of §9.6.1(c) of the agreement. According to Buchalski's testimony, 
the change in legal position resulted from his direct conversation with the attorney for 
the Steelworkers. 
It is undisputed that the Steelworkers filed and processed a grievance in 2003 on 
Buchalski's behalf alleging that the City violated the agreement by terminating his health 
insurance benefits.2 The grievance was heard at an arbitration in February 2005. At 
the close of the arbitration, Buchalski was advised by Steelworkers' representative 
Thomas Vitello (Vitello) that if he successfully applied for New York State disability 
retirement, his'contractual right for health insurance benefits would expire.3 
Consistent with that advice, in its post-hearing brief, the Steelworkers argued to 
2
 Section 9.6.1(c) of the parties' agreement states: 
The City will maintain these contractual benefits for the 
duration of the compensation period: medical, dental and 
prescription coverage, contribution to the Retirement System 
at the earning rate. Joint Exhibit 1, p. 19. 
3
 Transcript, pp. 41-42. 
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the arbitrator that: 
Regarding the continuation of health insurance, it is the 
Unions [sic.]contention that "the duration of compensation 
period" as stated in Subsection 9.61c is from the time the 
employee is injured and approved by Workers Compensation, 
continuing until the employee files for and is granted New York 
State disability retirement. (Consistent with CE #1), then 
Subsection 10.3.1 would apply.4 
On March 22, 2005, the arbitrator issued a decision and award sustaining the 
grievance and ordering the City to restore Buchalski's health insurance coverage and to 
make him whole.5 • 
In 2006, Buchalski applied for and was granted disability retirement by the New 
York State and Local Retirement System. After he was granted disability retirement 
benefits, Buchalski was notified by the Niagara Falls Water Board (Water Board),6 in a 
letter dated July 19, 2006, that his contractual health insurance would terminate, 
effective October 1, 2007.7 Shortly after receiving the Water Board's 2006 letter, 
Buchalski was advised by Vitello that the letter was consistent with the terms of the 
4
 Respondent Exhibit 2, p. 2. Section 10.3.1 states: "City will continue to pay for Health 
Benefits as provided in Section 10.1; one (1) month for each year of service for 
employees retiring under the New York State Disability Retirement Plan." Joint Exhibit 
1,p. 24. 
5
 Charging Party Exhibit 4. 
6
 The City is named as a statutory party to the charge pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
Although the City was Buchalski's employer at the time of his termination and when he 
applied for disability retirement, it appears from the record that the Water Board may be 
the successor employer. However, no exceptions have been filed to the declination by 
the ALJ to determine whether the City or the Water Board is the appropriate statutory 
party. Supra note 1, 42 PERB at 4749, n.1. Therefore, the issue is waived. Rules, 
§213.2(b)(4); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 (2007), confirmed, Town of 
Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB fi7008 (Sup Ct Albany 
County 2007). 
Charging Party Exhibit 6. 
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agreement. 
In 2007, after his contractual benefits were terminated, Buchalski contacted a 
Steelworkers' representative, Joseph LaGamba (LaGamba), and requested that he 
ascertain whether the Steelworkers would take action to enforce the arbitrator's award. 
In December 2007, LaGamba informed Buchalski that the Steelworkers would not 
pursue his legal claim based upon a legal opinion, dated December 4, 2007, from its 
attorney. In his opinion, the Steelworkers' counsel concluded the termination of 
Buchalski's contractual health insurance benefits in 2007, following the grant of 
disability retirement, was consistent with the terms of the agreement and the arbitration 
award.8 At Buchalski's request, he received a copy of the Steelworkers' counsel's 
opinion during a meeting with LaGamba in early January 2008. Thereafter, Buchalski 
retained private counsel who sent two letters to the Steelworkers' counsel requesting 
that he reconsider his merits-based determination. After not receiving responses to the 
requests for reconsideration, the improper practice charge was filed on May 15, 2008. 
DISCUSSION 
In his exceptions, Buchalski challenges the ALJ's conclusion that the charge is 
untimely and that his duty of fair representation claim is without merit. 
1. Timeliness 
Pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules, an improper practice charge must be filed 
within four-months from the date a charging party knew or should have known of the 
facts that constitute the alleged violation.9 A request for reconsideration will not toll the 
B
 Charging Party Exhibit 7. 
9
 TWU (Abraham), 36 PERB ^3008 (2003). 
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commencement of the filing period under §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules unless the charging 
party demonstrates a reasonable non-subjective belief that the decision was not final.10 
In the present case, Buchalski knew or should have known that the Steelworkers 
would not be taking action to challenge the cancellation of his health insurance benefits 
based upon his conversation with LaGamba in December 2007. Therefore, the time 
period for Buchalski to file a charge under the Rules commenced following that 
December 2007 conversation. 
In his exceptions, Buchalski contends that his time for filing a charge was tolled 
based upon the pendency of his attorney's letters requesting that the Steelworkers 
reconsider its decision not to pursue a contractual grievance or a proceeding to enforce 
the arbitration award. Based upon the facts and circumstances in the present case, we 
find that Buchalski has failed to demonstrate that his attorney's requests for 
reconsideration constitute a reasonable and objective basis for concluding that the 
Steelworkers' December 2007 decision was non-final. The evidence reveals that 
Buchalski's requests for reconsideration were not a part of a Steelworkers' internal 
appeals procedure that ends in a final determination on whether to pursue a contract 
grievance or a legal claim. The mere fact that the Steelworkers changed its mind in 
2003, with respect to the merits of Buchalski's earlier grievance, does not establish a 
reasonable basis for him to believe that its subsequent 2007 decision was non-final. In 
fact, it is undisputed that Buchalski was informed in 2005 by a Steelworkers' 
representative that if he received New York State disability retirement benefits, his 
contractual right for health insurance benefits would end. 
10
 County of Onondaga, 12 PERB 1J3035 (1979), confirmed, County of Onondaga v New 
York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 77 AD2d 783, 13 PERB 1J7011 (4th Dept 1980). 
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2. Merits of the Claim 
Even if the charge were timely, we would dismiss it because of its lack of merit. 
In general, the duty of fair representation does not include an obligation by an employee 
organization to pursue litigation on behalf of a unit member. However, if an employee 
organization has represented other unit members in similar litigation that was 
successful, and the evidence demonstrates that the denial of representation to the 
charging party was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, a violation of §209-a.2(c) of 
the Act can be established.11 
In the present case, Buchalski has not presented any evidence demonstrating 
that the Steelworkers has previously commenced similar litigation on behalf of other unit 
members seeking to enforce an arbitration award. Furthermore, he has failed to 
demonstrate that the Steelworkers' denial of his request to enforce the arbitration award 
aimed at challenging the termination of his contractual benefits in 2007 was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. We permit employee organizations a "wide range of 
reasonableness in making decisions associated with the processing of a grievance."12 
A similar standard is applicable to decisions by employee organizations on whether to 
pursue litigation on behalf of a unit member. 
In the present case, the arbitration award cannot reasonably be interpreted as 
prohibiting the termination of Buchalski's contractual health insurance benefits following 
the grant of disability retirement benefits by the New York State and Local Retirement 
System. Finally, we conclude that the Steelworkers' decision to not pursue a new 
11
 PEF (Hartner), 15 PERB 1J3066 (1982). 
12
 PEF (Reese), 29 PERB 1J3027 at 3062 (1996). 
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grievance or litigation on behalf of Buchalski was well within the wide range of 
reasonableness granted to employee organizations under the Act. 
Based upon the foregoing, the exceptions filed by Buchalski are denied and the 
ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it is hereby 
dismissed. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
'•-J/Atrtyxs-
/ / Jerome Lefkgwitz airman 
1/ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
£2, 
Sheila S. Cot€, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
") PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MICHAEL ABRAHAMS, 
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-and- CASE NO. U-28292 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
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INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on a pro se motion, dated December 7, 2009, by 
Michael Abrahams (Abrahams) requesting an extension of time to file exceptions, 
pursuant to §213.4 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ), dated October 6, 2009, on an improper practice charge, as amended, 
filed by Abrahams alleging that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On April 15, 2008, Abrahams filed an improper practice charge alleging that 
CSEA violated §§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act when it refused to process to arbitration 
his grievance challenging his termination by the Village of Hempstead (Village). During 
the processing of the charge, Abrahams was represented by attorney Stafford H. Byers 
(Byers). 
CSEA and the Village filed answers to the charge and a pre-hearing conference 
was scheduled for September 3, 2008 at PERB's Brooklyn office. Byers and Abrahams 
failed to appear at the pre-hearing conference. 
After CSEA and the Village moved to dismiss the charge, Byers filed an affidavit 
setting forth an explanation for the non-appearance. In his affidavit, Byers stated that 
he had a family emergency on the day of the conference and that he had mistakenly 
calendared the conference for September 10, 2008. In addition, his affidavit indicated 
that he believed that the conference would be conducted telephonically. Based upon 
Byers' affidavit, the ALJ denied the motions to dismiss and rescheduled the conference 
for September 18, 2008. 
On April 14, 2009, a hearing was held on the charge before an ALJ. Following 
the submission of post-hearing briefs to the ALJ, the Appellate Division, Second 
Department suspended Byers from the practice of law for a one-year period 
commencing on September 11, 2009.1 On October 6, 2009, the ALJ issued her 
1
 Matter of Byers, 66 AD3d 155 (2d Dept 2009). 
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decision dismissing the charge.2 
On October 9, 2009, copies of the ALJ's decision were mailed by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, to Abrahams, Byers, CSEA's attorney, the Village and the 
Village's attorney. Our records establish that the envelope containing a copy of the 
ALJ's decision was received by Byers's office on October 13, 2009. The envelope 
addressed to Abrahams's last known address was not claimed and it was later returned 
to PERB by the United States Postal Service. In early December 2009, Abrahams 
contacted PERB's Brooklyn office about the status of his case and was informed that a 
decision had been issued. 
MOTION FOR LEAVE FOR EXTENSION 
In support of his motion, Abrahams states that he did not receive a copy of the 
decision because it was mailed to his former address and that Byers failed to advise 
him about the decision. In addition, he states that he first learned of the ALJ's decision 
when he contacted PERB's Brooklyn office. Thereafter, he contacted Byers's office and 
was informed that Byers was suspended from practicing law. Upon learning of Byers's 
suspension, Abrahams filed his motion with the Board for leave to extend his time to file 
exceptions. 
CSEA and the Village oppose Abrahams's motion contending that he fails to 
disclose the specific date when he learned about the issuance of the ALJ's decision 
from PERB's Brooklyn office. In addition, they oppose the motion on the grounds that 
the processing of the charge before the ALJ had been unduly delayed by Abrahams. 
2
 42 PERB 1J4573 (2009). 
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DISCUSSION 
Under §§213.2(a) and 213.4 of the Rules, exceptions must be filed with the 
Board withinl 5 working days after the receipt of a decision, and requests for an 
extension must be filed within the same time period. However, the Board has 
discretionary authority under §213.4 of the Rules to extend the time to request an 
extension of time to file exceptions upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances.3 
Extraordinary circumstances can be established through specific and detailed facts 
demonstrating that the failure to make a timely request for an extension was not the 
result of a neglectful error or the burdens from other obligations.4 
Under the unique facts and circumstances of the present case, we conclude that 
Abrahams has demonstrated extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of 
additional time to file exceptions pursuant to §213.4 of the Rules. It is not disputed that 
he did not receive a copy of the ALJ's decision from Byers or from PERB prior to the 
expiration of the time to file exceptions or to request an extension of time under the 
Rules. The first time that he became aware of the decision was when he contacted 
PERB's Brooklyn office in early December. His motion for relief under §213.4 of the 
Rules was filed less than four-working days after he learned of the issuance of the 
ALJ's decision and the suspension of Byers from practicing law. His failure to make an 
earlier request for an extension of time to file exceptions was not the result of his own 
neglect, omission or delays. In reaching that conclusion, we note that Byers did not 
3
 Onondaga Community Coll, 11 PERB 1J3008 (1978). 
4
 Bd ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 42 PERB 1J3037 (2009); 
NYSCOPBA (Hunter), 42 PERB P038 (2009). 
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inform PERB of his suspension from practice and/or provide the agency with the current 
mailing address of his client, Abrahams. 
Finally, we are not persuaded that the previous delays cited by CSEA and the 
Village warrant a denial of Abrahams's motion. A review of the record establishes that 
the adjournments, and the related inconveniences to PERB and the other parties, were 
attributable to Byers and not his client. For example, in his affidavit explaining his 
failure to appear at the pre-hearing conference, Byers references his own personal and 
professional reasons for the non-appearance. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Abrahams's exceptions will be timely if filed 
with the Board on or before February 22, 2010 with proof of service upon CSEA and the 
Village. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Yux^_^f yjh^L, 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
/ " ' Sheila S. Cole, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge alleging that 
the City of Oneonta (City) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when the City conditioned the promotion of CSEA unit president 
Dominic Pucci (Pucci) on CSEA agreeing to reopen the parties' collectively negotiated 
agreement (agreement) for the purpose of modifying the salary grade schedule. 
Following a hearing, the ALJ issued a decision dismissing the charge concluding 
that CSEA had failed to meet its burden of proof of demonstrating that the City violated 
the Act when it did not promote Pucci.1 
1
 40 PERB U4609 (2007). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, CSEA asserts that the ALJ erred in dismissing its charge 
contending that it met its burden of proof demonstrating that the City violated §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act when it failed to promote Pucci. The City supports the decision 
of the ALJ. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Pucci has been employed in the City's Police Department for over 17 years and 
holds the position of Data Entry Machine Operator (DEMO). Since July 2001, he has 
been the CSEA unit president for a bargaining unit of full-time City employees. 
Toward the end of the negotiations, which resulted in the parties' January 1, 
2000-December 31, 2003 agreement, the City and CSEA discussed proposed changes 
to the salary grade schedule contained in the prior agreement.2 Among the proposed 
changes were moving the DEMO position from a Grade 10to a Grade 3 and adding a 
Senior DEMO position as a Grade 10 to the list of positions on the schedule. The 
parties did not reach an agreement on the proposed changes, and the salary grade 
schedule in the agreement remained unchanged.3 
In 2000, Police Chief John J. Donadio (Donadio) spoke with Pucci about a 
possible promotion as a means of increasing his salary. Among the promotional 
positions discussed was a future Senior DEMO position. In 2002, Donadio contacted 
2
 Charging Party Exhibit 10. 
3
 Pucci was not a member of the CSEA negotiation team for the 2000-2003 agreement 
that was signed by the parties on August 2, 2001. Joint Exhibit 1. 
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the City of Oneonta Civil Service Commission (Commission)4 requesting the 
certification and classification of a Senior DEMO position. Following a July 2002 request 
from the Commission, Donadio submitted the required civil service form, which included 
a duty statement for the proposed new position along with the current duty statements 
for DEMO and other positions. In March 2005, the Commission approved the 
classification request for the Senior DEMO position. 
After the expiration of the 2000-2003 agreement, the parties engaged in 
collective negotiations for a successor agreement. Pucci was a member of CSEA's 
negotiation team. Between September 2004 and January 2006, he led CSEA members 
in informational picketing over the status of negotiations in front of City Hall and outside 
the homes of then Mayor Kim K. Muller, Alderman Keith Bott, and City Chamberlain 
David Martindale. 
Following the election of Mayor John Nader (Nader), negotiations between the 
parties resumed in January 2006. On January 11, 2006, Pucci obtained a copy of the 
proposed changes to the salary grade schedule that had been discussed during the 
negotiations resulting in the 2000-2003 agreement. The City and CSEA held informal 
discussions about modifying the salary grade schedule but those changes were not 
incorporated into an April 2006 memorandum of agreement between the parties.5 
In 2006, Mayor Nader created a Personnel Committee to review supervisory 
requests for new positions and recommendations for promotions. According to Mayor 
Nader, he recommended to the Personnel Committee that the City create positions 
4
 The Commission has jurisdiction over the City, the Oneonta City School District, the 
Oneonta Public Library and the City of Oneonta Housing Authority. Transcript, p. 104. 
5
 Respondent Exhibit 14. 
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priorto deciding to fill them. The Personnel Committee is chaired by Alderman Paul 
Robinson (Robinson) and its other members are Alderman Julie Carney (Carney) and 
Alderman Michael Nader. Under City procedures, when the Personnel Committee 
approves a recommendation, it is forwarded to the City's Finance Committee for 
consideration. If the Finance Committee agrees with the recommendation, it is 
forwarded to the Common Council for final action. However, the committee structure 
can be circumvented with respect to a personnel matter by a Common Council member 
making a motion at the beginning of a Council meeting. 
In May 2006, the Commission conducted a promotional examination for the 
Senior DEMO position. The stated purpose for the examination was to establish an 
eligibility list to fill a future vacancy with the City. As a result of the civil service 
examination, Pucci was the top ranked candidate on the eligibility list certified by the 
Commission on June 21, 2006. The second candidate on the list was Linda Stiefel 
(Stiefel), another DEMO, who is also a CSEA unit officer.6 
One week after the list's certification, Chief Donadio sent a memorandum to 
Mayor Nader recommending Pucci for the Senior DEMO position at a starting annual 
salary of $32,000, which constituted a proposed $6,000 salary increase for Pucci. 
According to Donadio's memorandum, the Senior DEMO position had already been 
created by the Common Council. In the memorandum, Donadio described Pucci as an 
exemplary employee and he urged the Personnel Committee to approve his 
recommendation. 
On July 17, 2006, the Personnel Committee met to consider the recommended 
6
 Stiefel was a CSEA Unit Executive Vice-President and a member of a prior CSEA 
negotiation committee. Joint Exhibit 1; Transcript, p. 93. 
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promotion of Pucci and the recommended promotion of Brian Cole to Central Garage 
Working Supervisor. The meeting was attended by the Personnel Committee members 
along with City Personnel Officer John Insetta and Donadio. During the meeting, the 
appropriateness of the proposed raise for Pucci was discussed. The Personnel 
Committee compared the proposed salary for the new position with Stiefel's salary as a 
DEMO along with the salary increases received by other unit members. In addition, 
Carney expressed reservations about Pucci's job performance, which she had 
witnessed as a fellow City Police Department employee. As a result of the meeting, the 
Personnel Committee approved Pucci's promotion but reduced the proposed salary 
increase from $6,000 to $2,500.7 In addition, the Personnel Committee approved 
Cole's promotion without any change in the proposed salary. 
Following the Personnel Committee meeting, Robinson notified the Finance 
Committee that the Personnel Committee would not be forwarding the recommendation 
for Pucci's promotion until CSEA agreed to modify the salary grade schedule in the 
recently concluded agreement. 
Two days after the Personnel and Finance Committee meetings, Robinson sent 
an email to Pucci, about the status of his promotion, stating that: 
There have been people promoted to position that did not 
exist. That is no more. The Chamberlain has a "proposed" 
updated Salary Grade Schedule. The Unit needs to review it 
and either agree to it or propose changes. The proposal 
does include Senior D.E.M.O. Once the Union and the City 
agree on the schedule, employees can be promoted to any 
position on it. The Chief has made a strong case for you. 
The Personnel Committee thinks it is wrong to order a test 
for a position that does not exist. The process is being 
7
 Charging Party Exhibit 4. 
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worked out. 
Hang in there, you will be promoted once the schedule is 
adopted.8 
On the same day, Pucci sent an email to Mayor Nader alleging that the delay in 
considering his proposed promotion was based upon his status as a unit representative 
in violation of the Act.9 In response, Mayor Nader sent an email to Pucci stating that: 
I will follow thru. I am up to speed, I believe, with the 
promotion request. My understanding is that the personnel 
committee will review such matters. At this point do we even 
have a senior DEMO position created?10 
In response to the City's request, Pucci refused, on behalf of CSEA, to agree to 
reopen the agreement and modify the salary grade schedule in exchange for the City's 
further consideration of the proposed promotion. In early August 2006, Mayor Nader 
learned that the City had the right to unilaterally create the new position and set the 
initial salary without CSEA's approval and without modifying the schedule.11 Following 
receipt of this knowledge, the recommended promotion of Pucci did not receive any 
further consideration by the City. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, CSEA contends that the ALJ made a factual error in concluding 
that the Personnel Committee suspended the City's consideration of Pucci's promotion. 
CSEA also asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to find that the City violated §§209-
Charging Party Exhibit 5; Respondent Exhibit 11. 
9
 Respondent Exhibit 11. 
10
 Respondent Exhibit 11. 
11
 Respondent 15; Transcript, pp. 209-210. 
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a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act based upon her conclusion that the City met its burden of 
persuasion of demonstrating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions 
toward the proposed promotion of Pucci. 
Contrary to CSEA's fact-based exception, the evidence in the record supports 
the ALJ's finding that the Personnel Committee suspended consideration of Pucci's 
promotion by refusing to forward its recommendation to the Finance Committee until 
CSEA agreed to modify the salary grade schedule in the agreement. While the 
evidence demonstrates that the Personnel Committee initially approved Pucci's 
promotion, it later decided not to forward that recommendation to the Finance 
Committee until the negotiated schedule was changed. 
Next, we consider CSEA's exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusion that the 
City met its burden of persuasion demonstrating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 
for its conduct. In considering the exceptions, we note that CSEA does not contest the 
applicability of our burden-shifting analysis to the present case. Similarly, although 
CSEA contends that the City's conduct is inherently destructive, it does not dispute that 
the improper motivation inherent in a perse violation case is rebuttable by the City 
presenting evidence demonstrating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. 
Neither party has filed exceptions to the ALJ's conclusion that CSEA 
demonstrated a prima facie case of improper motivation under §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of 
the Act. Therefore, that argument is waived.12 
Consequently, our focus centers on CSEA's claim that the ALJ erred in 
12
 See, Rules of Procedure, §213.2(b)(4); Town ofOrangetown, 40 PERB fl3008 
(2007), confirmed sub nom, Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 
40 PERB 1J7008 (Sup Ct, Albany Co 2007). 
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concluding that the City met its burden of persuasion demonstrating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason based upon the testimony of Alderman Robinson. 
Robinson testified that the City's consideration of Pucci's promotion to Senior 
DEMO was postponed by the Personnel Committee based upon his good faith, but 
mistaken, belief that a modification to the salary schedule was a necessary prerequisite 
to promote Pucci. However, shortly after the Personnel Committee decided to delay 
sending its recommendation to the Finance Committee, Mayor Nader learned that the 
City had the right to unilaterally create positions and to set initial salaries without 
negotiating a modification of the schedule with CSEA. Although Nader was in 
communication with Robinson with respect to the Personnel Committee's actions, 
Nader did not take any action to correct the erroneous understanding of Robinson and 
the other members of the Personnel Committee. Similarly, he did not take any steps to 
have the proposed promotion considered by the Finance Committee or the Common 
Council. Instead, Nader continued to advise Pucci that his promotion was conditioned 
upon CSEA agreeing to changes in the agreement. During his testimony, Nader failed 
to explain his conduct with respect to the proposed promotion, after learning that the 
City had the unilateral authority to create positions and set initial salaries. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that the City met its 
burden of persuasion of demonstrating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
conduct toward Pucci and conclude that the City violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act. 
In light of our finding of a violation of the Act, we next turn to the question of the 
appropriate remedy. The record establishes that the recommended promotion of Pucci 
to the position of Senior DEMO has not been reviewed or acted upon by the Finance 
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,-'-"N Committee and the Common Council as the result of the City's violation of the Act. 
Therefore, to return Pucci to the status quo ante, we order the City to forthwith take all 
necessary actions to render a final determination on the recommended promotion of 
Pucci to the position of Senior DEMO without regard to his union activities and the 
refusal by CSEA to reopen the agreement to modify the salary grade schedule.13 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. Take all necessary actions to render a final determination on the 
recommended promotion of Dominic Pucci to the Senior DEMO position; 
2. Cease and desist from conditioning Dominic Pucci's promotion to the Senior 
DEMO promotion on the reopening of the agreement to modify the salary 
grade schedule; 
3. Cease and desist from denying Dominic Pucci a promotion to the Senior 
DEMO position based upon his union activities; 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations customarily used to post 
notices to employees in CSEA's bargaining unit. 
DATED: February 8, 2010 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
Sheila S. Gole, Member 
J2. 
13
 Board Chairman Lefkowitz took no part. 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Oneonta in the unit represented by 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO that the 
City of Oneonta will: 
1. Forthwith take all necessary actions to render a final determination on the 
recommended promotion of Dominic Pucci to Senior DEMO; 
2. Not condition Dominic Pucci's promotion to Senior DEMO on the reopening of 
the agreement to modify the salary grade schedule; 
3. Not deny Dominic Pucci a promotion to Senior DEMO based upon his union 
activities. 
Dated By 
on behalf of City of Oneonta 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
